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FEDERAL JURISDICTION AND PRACTICE
ANTIDUMPING

Acr

The Antidumping Act, was enacted by Congress to prevent actual
or threatened harm to a domestic corporation, caused by the sale of
merchandise in the United States at a price lower than that charged in
2
the country of origin.
Proceedings under the Antidumping Act are initiated 3 by issuance
of a notice by the Customs Bureau stating that the Commissioner of
Customs suspects that imported goods are being sold for less than the
price charged in the exporter's domestic market.4 The Secretary of the
Treasury must then decide within the ensuing three month period
whether the foreign merchandise is presently, or likely to be, sold at
less than its fair market value. 5
If the Secretary of the Treasury arrives at a "less than fair market
value" decision, the matter is remanded to the Tariff Commission,
whose obligation is to ascertain whether sale at a "less than fair market
value" poses either an actual or threatened injury to a domestic industry.6 If it is concluded that a domestic industry is so threatened, the
Treasury Department is then obligated to publish7 this conclusion and
to assess a special duty based on the price differential8 between the
1 Antidumping

Act, 1921, § 201, 42 Stat. 11, as amended, 19 U.S.C. § 160 (1970).
2See Note, The Antidumping Act: Problems of Administration and Proposals for
Change, 17 STAN. L. Rav. 730 (1965); Baier, Substantive Interpretations Under the Antidumping Act and the Foreign Trade Policy of the United States, 17 STAN. L. Rv. 409
(1965). See generally Coudert, The Application of the United States Antidumping Law in
the Light of a Liberal Trade Policy, 65 COLUrM. L. Ray. 189 (1965); Kohn, The Anti.
dumping Act: Its Administration and Place in American Trade Policy, 60 MicH. L. REv.
407 (1962).
3 There are two methods of initiating an Antidumping proceeding. First, a domestic
manufacturer may make a complaint directly to the Treasury Department. 29 Fed. Reg.
16320, amending 19 C.F.R. § 14.6(b) (1964). Or secondly, an official of the Customs Bureau
who suspects a "dumping" infraction may notify the Treasury Department. 19 C.F.R.
§ 14.6(a) (1964). See generally Hendrick, The United States Antidumping Act, 58 AM.
J. INT. L. 914 (1964).

4 19 U.S.C. § 160 (1970).
51d. § 160(a).
GThe Tariff Commission will also try to determine if a domestic industry has been
prevented from being established by the importation of such goods into the United
States. Id.
7 Under 19 U.S.C. § 160(b) (1958) publication is made by the Treasury Department
in the Federal Register. For possibility of waiver as to publication as required by this
section see U.S. v. Elof Hansson Inc., 296 F.2d 779 (C.C.P.A. 1960) where an importer
waived his right to publication by active participation in the investigation.
8 19 U.S.C. § 161 (Supp. I, 1971), amending 19 U.S.C. § 161 (1958). Determination of
a sale at less than fair market value is a complex procedure that must take into account
the varying levels of trade as well as the different services and conditions given the buyer
in the United States as opposed to those provided in the importer's domestic market place.
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exporter's domestic and the United States' selling price. The importer
may protest the publication and assessment with the Customs Bureau
and, if denied, appeal to the customs court.9
In J.C. Penney Co., v. Treasury Dep't.,10 the petitioner, J.C. Penney
Co., (hereinafter Penney) sought declaratory and injunctive relief in a
federal district court to prohibit the Treasury Department from conducting its investigation as to the "dumping" of certain Japanese television sets." Penney alleged the district court's12 basis of jurisdiction was
a general federal question, 3 in that procedures used by the Treasury
Department, particularly involving receipt of evidence, constituted a
denial of procedural due process, and damages in excess of $10,000 were
claimed. The Second Circuit Court of Appeals upheld the district court's
dismissal of Penney's suit for lack of subject matter jurisdiction 14 on the
ground that jurisdiction of constitutional questions in antidumping
cases was vested exclusively in the customs court. 15
The court acknowledged that Penney, though mounting an attack
on the substantive merits of the case, was arguing that since it was being
denied procedural due process in the Treasury Department's investigation, an adequate remedy was available only in the federal district
court.16 The court reviewed several prior decisions in point, including
David L. Moss Co., Inc. v. United States17 which held that the customs
court is the tribunal established by Congress to provide a "complete
system" for the administration of customs laws and questions involving
9 Appeal may also be taken from the Customs Court to the Court of Customs and
Patent Appeals. 19 U.S.C. § 169 (1970). formerly CH. 488 § 1, 45 STAT. 1475 (1929).
10 439 F.2d 63 (2d Cir. 1971).

1 Penney contended lack of due process in that the Treasury Department is not
required to disclose the facts upon which it has made its determination of a sale or
potential sale at less than fair market value. Id. at 65.
12 Suit was initially brought in the United States District Court for the Southern
District of New York. 319 F. Supp. 1023 (S.D.N.Y. 1970).
13 28 U.S.C. § 1331(a) (1958).
14 439 F.2d at 65.
15 In 28 U.S.C. § 1582(a) (1970) Formerly CH. 646, 62 STAT. 943 (1948). Congress has
provided for the exclusive jurisdiction of the customs court. See also 28 U.S.C. § 1340
(1948) which provides,
The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any dvil action arising
under any Act of Congress providing for internal revenue, or revenue from
imports or tonnage except matters within the jurisdiction of the Customs Court.
16 439 F.2d at 65.
17 103 F.2d 395 (C.C.P.A. 1939). "The court is a court of law, and it is granted full
power to relieve against illegality in the assessment or collection of Duties." Id. at 397.
See Cottman Co. v. Dailey, 94 F.2d 85 (4th Cir. 1938) (Congress has provided a complete
system of corrective justice with respect to matters arising under the customs laws.) See
generally Patchogue-Plymouth Mills Corp. v. Durning, 101 F.2d 41 (2d Cir. 1939); Riccomini v. United States, 69 F.2d 480 (9th Cir. 1934).
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the validity of official action are exclusively within the jurisdiction of the
customs court. The court found that when Congress adopted legislation"" in 1948 providing for the "exclusive jurisdiction" of the customs
court, Congress was aware of the several prior pertinent decisions1 9 and
thus intended that all litigation regarding customs matters be within the
exclusive jurisdiction of the customs court. In addition, the court
buttressed its conclusion regarding congressional intent by examining
legislation 0 enacted in 1970 which provided that the customs court
should determine any civil action which involves inter alia broad or
significant implications in administering or interpreting customs laws,
including all constitutional questions.
The precedents 2 ' cited by Penney in arguing that the jurisdiction
of the customs court is not exclusive, were found to be inapposite because in none of the cases cited were the foreign goods challenged under
provisions of the customs law but, instead, under various trademark or
criminal statutes.
Penney also argued that the district court had jurisdiction over the
subject matter because the customs court was powerless to require the
holding of a hearing by the Treasury Department and only the district
court was so empowered. The court held that since Penny could pay any
amounts assessed and then sue for refund in the customs court, there was
22
in fact an adequate remedy available to Penney in the customs court.

The court also indicated that to permit suit in the district court in
this case would contravene section 7421 of the Internal Revenue Code of
1954,23 which prohibits a suit "for the purpose of restraining the assessment or collection of any tax" because restraint of levy of tax even at
the incipient stage of suit must necessarily delay collection of the tax.
It is quite apparent that the result of this decision is to reaffirm that
the customs court has exclusive jurisdiction over all disputes involving
customs laws, including questions of substantive and procedural due
1828 U.S.C. §§ 1582, 1583 (1948). Section 1583 was repealed, effective October 1, 1970.
Act of June 2, 1970. Pub. L. No. 91-271, tit. I, § 111, 84 Stat. 278.
19 Patchogue-Plymouth Mills Corp. v. Durning, 101 F.2d 41 (2d Cir. 1939); David L.
Moss Co., Inc. v. United States, 103 F.2d 395 (C.C.P.A. 1939); (Both cases made clear
that the customs court was to have exclusive jurisdiction over customs matters.)

20 28 U.S.C. § 1582(a) (1970).

21 Croton Watch Co. v. Laughlin, 208 F.2d 93 (2d Cir. 1953) (Suit brought for
prohibition of the entrance of goods into the United States because of trademark or name
infringement.); Predse Imports Corp. v. Kelly, 218 F. Supp. 494 (S.D.N.Y. 1963), aff'd
378 F.2d 1014 (2d Cir. 1967). (Exclusion of switchblade knives based upon criminal statutes).
22 439 F.2d at 65. Cf. Eastern States Petroleum Corp. v. Rogers, 280 F.2d 611, 614
(D.C. Cir. 1960).
23 439 F.2d at 68.
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process of law. It would seem that an importer will be successful in asserting non-exclusive jurisdiction of the customs court over foreign
goods only in cases involving statutes such as trademarks or patent infringement or criminal sanction, that is, statutes which are not part of
the customs laws.
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE -

RULE

11

Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure concerns pleas
by criminal defendants and the basis on which they should be accepted.
It states, interalia, that
[t]he court may refuse to accept a plea of guilty, and shall not
accept such plea .

.

. without first addressing the defendant per-

sonally or determining that the plea is made voluntarily with
understanding of the . . . consequences of the plea. 24
The majority of courts subscribe to a reading which brings ineligibility
for parole within the meaning of Rule 11 ;25 i.e., ineligibility for parole
is a consequence of a plea of which a defendant must be informed. 28
24 FED. R. CRINs. P. 11. The phrase "understanding of the . . . consequences of the
plea" was added by a 1966 Amendment, effective July 1, 1966 "to state what dearly is the
law." FED. R. CRIM. P. 11, Notes of Advisory Committee on Criminal Rules. Rule 11
sets no standard by which to determine what is a legitimate "consequence" of which
defendant must be informed. However, since the statute was amended to incorporate
judicial decision in 1966 it might be assumed that judicial decision can define the
term.
25 See Harris v. United States, 426 F.2d 99 (6th Cir. 1970); Jenkins v. United States,
420 F.2d 433 (10th Cir. 1970); Durant v. United States, 410 F.2d 689 (1st Cir. 1969); Berry
v. United States, 412 F.2d 189 (3d Cir. 1969); Munich v. United States, 337 F.2d 356 (9th
Cir. 1964). But see Trujillo v. United States, 377 F.2d 266 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 389
U.S. 899 (1967). This decision was subsequently limited to its specific facts. Spradley v.
United States, 421 F.2d 1043 (5th Cir. 1970).
26 Berry v. United States, 412 F.2d 189 (3d Cir. 1969) has been cited as the leading
case. 8 J. MooRE, FEDERAL PRACTICE 11.03[3] n.26 (Supp. 1970).

[N]ot every result of a plea is a "consequence" ....
United States v. Cariola,
323 F.2d 180 (3 Cir. 1963) ....
[S]ome . . . suggest that the ineligibility for parole should be similarly
categorized ....
In any normal sentencing procedure in the federal courts, a sentence prescribing a number of years of imprisonment generally means that the defendant
may expect to serve approximately one-third of this term with good conduct.
Probation and parole are concepts which our society has come to accept as natural
incidents of rehabilitation during imprisonment.
This is not true where, as here, because of a Congressional directive tucked
away in a relatively obscure section of the Internal Revenue Code, a narcotics
offender is faced with the unconditional loss of probation and parole. This loss
becomes an inseparable ingredient of the punishment imposed. Its effect is so
powerful that it translates the term imposed by the sentencing judge into a
mandate of actual imprisonment for a period of time three times as long as
that ordinarily expected.
The mandate of Rule 11, before and after the 1966 amendment, is designed
to insure that the pleader is made aware of the outer limits of punishment.
At the very least, this means that he must be apprised of the period of required
incarceration. Except for capital punishment, no other consequence can be as significant to an accused as the period of possible confinement. When one enters

